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Notes and Comments
THIRD PARTY PRACTICE - IMPLEADER
Third party practice, or impleader, a liberal procedure relatively
new to practitioners in many jurisdictions today found overwhelming
opposition in the common law courts. Common law rules of procedure were at the same tm-e so strict that if a plaintiff inadvertently
failed to join a proper party in his suit, he could not correct the
mistake by any method, but instead he had to drop his suit and
begin an entirely new action.'
Furthermore, if a defendant wished to bring a party into the suit,
on the grounds that that party was indebted in some way to him by
reason of the same transaction out of which the original action arose,
he could not do so. Thus the surety on a note could be sued by the
holder and his only recourse against the principal was in a subsequent
separate action.- One justification for the rule was that a plaintiff
should not be forced to sue anyone other than the party whom he
3
chose to sue.
The bringing of third parties into a suit is not new in courts of
Equity 4 This is not surprising, in view of the fact that Equity
doctrines with respect to parties were quite different from those
wh,ch prevailed at common law The main function of these courts
in such cases was to give all relief possible, and to adjust m a single
suit the rights and duties of all parties, growing out of or connected
with the subject matter of that suit.1
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1 (16th Am. ed. 1840). As was stated by one testwriter:

The doctrines of common law concerning the parties to actions, their joint
or several rights and liabilities, and the form of judgment based upon their respective kinds of right and liability, are the crowning techmcality of the system resting
upon verbal premises which mean nothing, and built up from these premises by
the most accurate processes of mere verbal logic. It was a fundamental principle
that no one could be a plaintiff unless he was alone or jointly with the co-plaintiffs
entitled to the whole recovery, nor a defendant unless he was alone or jointly with
the co-defendants liable to the entire demand. The common law knew no such
thing as the making a person plaintiff who did not share the right of recovery, or
defendant who was not liable for the whole claim, merely for the purpose of
binding him by the judgment and cutting off any possible right on his part.

(Italics of text writer). The judgment must be one single, entire recovery, both
as effects the plaintiffs and the defendants; and no one could be plaintiff who did
not thus hold the legal title, even though beneficial interest in the cause of action
belong to another.
" See POmEROY, EQUrrY JUISPRUDENCE, 150 (5th ed. 1941).
Federal Bank v. Hamson, 10 Ont. Pr. Rep. 271 (1884).
'Bolton v. Donovan, 9 N.D. 575, 84 N.W 357 (1900); For Kentucky cases
see, Wahl v. Lockwood & Gasser, 227 Ky. 183, 185, 12 S.W 2d 321, 322
(1928); M. Livingston & Co. v. Philley, 155 Ky. 224, 226, 159 S.W 665 (1913).
'CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 408 (2nd ed. 1947).
1 PomEaoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 152 (5th ed. 1941).
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It was inevitable that even in courts of law an adjustment would
be made vherebv a defendant to a suit would be given relief when
he had a genume claim over against a third party Perhaps it is not unusual that this relief eventually found its way into English land law
for in old England land was a prized possession. Thus where X sold
land to Y, with warranty of title, and Z sued Y to recover the land,
Y could vouch X m as warrantor and request or offer an opportunity
to X to defend Z's action against him.' If Z recovered then Y was
obliged to bring an independent action against X to recover on the
warranty Whether or not X complied with Y's request to come m
and defend, he was bound by the outcome of the action against his
warrantee, and in Y's action against X, Y needed only to show the
notice or request, the judgment, and X's warrantv to him. 7 The above
procedural device, known as "vouching to warranty" actually originated in personal property law but was later adapted to real property
law
Third party practice was provided for in England as a general
device as early as 1873. 9 One of the earliest cases on the subject
arose in 1 876.i ° It involved an action brought by-the owner of a ship
against the charterer to recover demurrage incurred for failure to
unload the vessel with required expedition. The defendant brought
m the consignee of the cargo as a third party alleging the latter had
neglected to unload the cargo quickly enough, and therefore was
liable to the charterer. This procedure was approved by the court.
It should be noted that the English statute did not expressly authorize
a defendant to bring in a third party who is liable only to the plaintiff."
As far as can be determined impleader was sanctioned for the
first time in this country in an Admiralty case in 1883.12 This practice, as contemplated by our present Federal Rule 14 was introduced
into state procedure in New York by 1922.13 There the action was
also confined to cases m which the third party was liable over to the
original defendant, and remains so under the law today 14 Pennsylvania which adopted the practice in 1929,15 has amended its provision
JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 110 (2d ed.
1 FaR.ENiA, JUDGmENTs, 999 (5th ed. 1925).
DIcBY, HiSTonY OF THE LAw OF REAuL PROPERTY, 80 fn.

1922).
(4th ed. 1892).

Supreme Court of Judicature Act 36 and 87 Victonae, C. 66, See. 26 (3)

(187:3).

Swansea Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Duncan Fox & Co., 1 Q. B. D. 644 (1876).
"See note 9 supra.
'The Hudson, 15 F 162 (S.D. N.Y. 1888).
LCohen, Impleader: Enforcement of Defendants Rights Against Third
Parties, :33 Col. L.R. 1147, 1152 fn. 32 (1933).
"N.Y. Clm PRACTICE ACT, sec. 193 (a) (Thompson 1946).
Act of April 10, 1929, P.L. 479, see. 1, amended by P.L. 663, see. 2
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to permit the defendant to implead not only any party liable over to
him, but also any party jointly or severally liable to the plaintiff
directly 10 Wisconsin, another precursor of federal practice, introduced
it in restricted form in 1935,17 and still requires that the third party
be liable over to the defendant before he may be brought in.
So much for the historical development of third party procedures.
Let us now turn to the practice as it exists under Federal Rule 14
today 19
At the outset it is important to note that Rule 14 is strictly procedural. It can establish no substantive right. A substantive right is
a necessary prerequisite to the use of the rule.20 In short, the rule
formerly contemplated the bringing m, by the defendant, of a third
party in two different situations: (1) where the defendant clanned
that the third party was or might be liable to him (the defendant)
for the claim asserted against him in the action; 21 or (2) where the
defendant claimed that he was not liable to the plaintiff for the claim
asserted against tim, but that the third party was.2(1931); P.L. 807, No. 125 sec. 1 (1933); and P.L. 2118, No. 428, see. 1 (1937);

12 PA.

STAT. ANN.

see. 141 (Purdon 1938).

"lIbd; East Broad Top Transit Co. v. Flood, 326 Pa. 353, 192, Adt. 401
(1937).
17 Kletecka, Impleader - A Compartson Between the Wisconsin and the Federal Practice, 27 Marq. L.R. 202 (1948).
"Wis. STAT. secs. 260.19 (3), 260.20 (1945).
1 FED. RI. Civ. P 14 (1948). The language is as follows: "(a) When Defendant May Bring in Third Party Before the service of his answer a defendant may
move ex parte or, after the service of his answer, on notice to the plaintiff, for
leave as a third-party plaintiff to serve a summons and complaint upon a person
not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the
plantiff's claim against hm. If the motion is granted and the summons and
complaint are served, the person so served, hereinafter called the third-party defendant, shall make is defenses to the third-party defendants as pro-ded i Rule
may
defendantwich
third-party
Theplantiff
clam. the
plaintiff's
has to the
plamtiff
13. third-party
The tird-party
defendant
may
assert aganst
the
any defenses
also assert any clam aganst the plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occurplanrence that is the subject matter of the plantifs clam against the third-party arsng
tiff. The plantiff may assert any clam aganst the third-party defendant
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plintif's
clam against the tird-party plantiff, and the third-party defendant thereupon
shall assert Is defenses as provded i Rule 12 and his counterclams and crosstis
claims as provided in Rule 13. A tird-party defendant may proceed under im
rule aginst any person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to
for all or part of the clam made i the action aginst the tird-party defendant.
As amended Dec. 27, 1946, effective March 19, 1948.
is
"(b). When Plantiff May Brng i Third Party. When a counterclam
iunder
asserted aganst a plantiff, he may cause a third party to be brought
circumstances which under this rule would entitle a defendant to do so.
SLamport Go., Inc. v. Teppen & Slutzker, 3 F.R.D. 49 (D. N.J. 1943).
other forms
Typimal of this group are claims of contribution, indenmity and
Fd30Supp. 150 (D.C. 1939).
of secondary liability See Saunders v. Goldsten,
of
test was formulated for this group of cases by Judge Luhrng, District719
o
Cn Imv. Lumberman s Mlutual Casualty o., 26 F Supp. 715,
Columbia.m
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One of the first problems raised was whether the language that
the defendant "may move" to bring in a third party plus the words
"if the motion is granted" certain results will follow, imply that the
right to bring in a third part), under Rule 14 is left to the discretion
of the court. This question was answered affirmatively by the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia 2. 3 A distinction was drawn
between Rule 14 and Admiralty Rule 56,24 and it was concluded
that such a right was within the sound discretion of the court. In
view of the language of the rule, such a result must have been
expected. So long as the courts formulate fairly uniform principles
in exercising their discretion, the purpose of the provision will be
carried out, but it is arguable that such a policy cannot be achieved
and that it might be well to provide by amendment for impleader
by the defendant as a matter of right.
The rule provides that a defendant may bring in a third party "who
is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against
him." The above italicized words are particularly significant. In
construing the word "may be liable" the courts have held that the
accrual of a right can be accelerated. Thus where a restaurant X
purchases contaminated food from Y Company which under state
law is not obligated to indemnify X until it suffers a loss, when Z
customer who ate the food sues X, X may implead Y in the suit.2
Clearly X has suffered no loss merely by the commencement of the
suit. However, under the language of the rule X's claim against Y is
accelerated.
In construing the word "claim," federal courts have, whenever
possible, given effect to the intention of the draftsmen of the rules,
that is to get away from the narrow concepts of the "cause of action"
and to substitute the idea of the claim as a "group or aggregate of

(D.C. 1939). A typical case is one involving joint tort feasors. See Burns v.
American Chicle Co., 29 F Supp. 773 (E.D. N.Y. 1939). It is important to note
that this second group above has been eliminated by the deletion of the words
"'or to the plaintiff" in Rule 14, in the amendment of Dec. 27, 1946 effective
March 19, 1948.
'General Taicab Assn v. O'Shea, 109 F 2d. 671 (App. D.C. 1940); See,
also, State of Mo. ex rel and to use of Ward v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 197
F 2d. 327 (C.A. Mo. 1950); Baltimore & Ohio Ry.Co. v. Saunder, 159 F 2d. 481
(C.C.A. WVa. 1947); Goodard v. Shasta S. S. Co. 9 F.R.D. 12 (D.C. N.Y. 1949);
Rutherford v. Pennsvlvama Greyhound Lines, 7 F.R.D. 245 (D.C. Ohio 1947);
Bull v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co. 6 F.R.D. 7 (D.C. Neb. 1946). Where the discretion is abused, the court will be reversed. See Spona v. Pennsylvama Greyhound Lines, 143 F 2d 105 (C.C.A. Pa. 1944).
-'28 U.S.C.A. Admiralty Rule 56, wherein it is stated that the claimant or
respondent "shall be entitled to bring in any other vessel or person," and thus in
admiralty impleader is a matter of right.
'-'uebv. B/G Foods, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 288 (D. Minn. 1942).
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operative facts gwng ground or occaszon for judicial action."'6 The
courts have not hesitated in giving the word a liberal interpretation.*The language of the rule seems fairly unambiguous. nevertheless
federal courts have been forced to dispel the idea that under it any
related controversy could be brought into the case. A good example
of this is seen in the case of Barnard-CurtissCo. v Maehl.28 There
it was held that a contractor being sued by a subcontractor for labor
and materials could not bring in the only creditor who is asserting
a claim for work done on the premises. Other cases have upheld
29
the proposition.
It is true that Rule 14 is fairly general in its terms as to whom
may be brought into the action. 30 However, it has been recognized
that the right to join others is not without limits. A particularly perplexing problem has arisen where cases of joint tort-feasors are concerned. A divergence of views in various states as to when the defendant has a substantive right against the third party has offered a
serious obstacle to the determination by the courts as to when one
,may take advantage of this procedure. A few states still retain the
old common law rule that joint tort-feasors are in part delicto and
have not right of contribution 3 , but it is not applied where one party
may be nmpleaded as third party defendant. 32 Another scheme permits
the right of contribution only between those tort-feasors in part delicto
who have been joined by plaintiff in the original action.3 3 In New
CLARIK, CODE PLEADING, 146 (2d ed. 1947).
' Jones v. Waterman Steamship Corp. 155 F 2d 992 (C.C.A. 3d 1946); See,
also, Fruit Growers Cooperative v. Califorma Pie and Baking Co., Inc., 2 F R. D.
415 (E.D. N.Y. 1942); Balcoff v. Teagarden, 86 F Supp. 224 (S.D. N.Y. 1940).
In the latter case, Judge Knox said: "To sanction the narrow construction proposed
by plaintiff would be tatamount to an emasculation of Rule 14, with a consequent
loss of its beneficient objectives."
-Barnard-Curtiss Co. v. Maehl, 117 F 2d 7 (C.C.A. 9th 1941).
'Heitman v. Davis, 119 F 2d 975 (C.C.A. 7th 1941). (The stockholders of
a national bank, sued on their liability as such, may not bnng in the only creditor
of the bank in an attempt to attack his claim and the validity of the assessment);
John N. Price & Sons v. Md. Casualty Co., 2 F.R.D. 408 (D. N.J. 1942) (A surety
company, sued on a matenalmans bond, could not implead subcontractors and
materialmen who had asserted claims on the board.)
The language is that, "A person, not a party to the action, who is or may be
liable for the claim asserted by the plaintiff may be brought in." Supra, note 19.
31 Many states have changed or done away with this rule either by court
decision or by statute. See Note 45 HaR. L.R. -369 (1931), collecting and analyzing the American statutes; Notes 85 A.L.R. 1091 (1933); 122 A.L.R. 520 (1939);
141 A.L.R. 1207 (1942).
'2 George A. Fuller Co. v. Otis, 245 U.S. 489, 38 S.ct. 180 (C.C.A. D.C.
1918).
N.Y. CrvL PRACTICE ACT, see. 211 (a) (Thompson 1941); TEXAs REV. STAT.,
Act 2212 (Vernon s 1936), Baylor Umversity v. Bradshaw, 52 S.W 2d 1094; VEST
VIRGINIA CODE ANN., sec. 5482 (1949), Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Saunders, 159
F 2d 481 (C.C.A. W Va. 1947); Judge Parker said: "
for it is clear that, under
'
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York City, if a person is not brought into the action by the plaintiff,
then he is not one who "is or may be liable to the defendant" within
S. 193(2) allowing impleader, 34 even though he was a joint tortfeasor, since under S. 211(a) 3 5 there is no claim for contribution
until a joint money judgment has been recovered against two or more
defendants, and if secured, until more than the claimant's share has
been paid.3' This result reached under a New York court's interpretation of its statutes on impleader and contribution between tort-feasors
best illustrates the fact that Rule 14 is merely a procedural device
37
which can be taken advantage of only if a substantive right exists.
It is not surprising that m view of this result the circuit court of
appeals in New York refused to allow impleader in a case resting
on diversity jurisdiction. Since in New York a defendant had no right
to contribution, except where plaintiff joined the other party, it was
held that Rule 14 could not be resorted to in federal court in New
Vork to implead a joint tort-feasor. 38
If state law permits contribution among tort-feasors whether or
not plaintiff has sued them all at the outset, there is plainly no problem, and defendant may join them. 39 If he fails to do so his substan40
tive right of contribution is not thereby affected.
Federal courts have found further problems involved in the inpleader of insurers. There is always a possibility that juries will be
prejudiced if they know the defendant is insured. Of course this need
not be considered if the case is tried by court without a jury Suppose a policy contains a clause stating that no action will lie against
the insurer until a judgment has been rendered against the insured.
It has been held that such a "no action" clause is directly opposed to
the policy of Rule 14 and is of no effect. 41 There is nothing inconsistent
in this result since it has already been shown that the accrual of a
42
right against a third party may be accelerated.
It is provided by Rule 14 that the defendant may make his motion
the law of XVest Virginia, contribution may be had among joint tort feasors, not
with respect to any inchoate liability, but only as to a joint judgment which has
already been obtained against them.
" See note 14 supra.
See note 32 supra.
WVard v. Iroqois Gas Co. 258 N.Y. 124, 179 N.E. 317 (1932); Fox v. Westem N.Y. Motor Lines, 257 N.Y. 305, 178 N.E. 289 (1931); Pnce v. Ryan, 255

N.Y. 16, 173, N.E. 907 (1930).

Gregory, Tort Contribution Practicein New York, 20 Corn. L.Q. 269 (1935).
"Bates v. Miller, 133 F 2d 645 (C.C.A. 2d 1943).
Gray v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Robison, 31 F Supp. 299, 32
F Supp. 335 (W.D. La. 1940).
'"Umon Paxing Co. v. Thomas, 9 F.R.D. 612 (D.C. Pa. 1949).
"Jordan v. Stephens, 7 F.R.D. 140, 142, (W.D. Mo. 1945).
'2See note 24 supra.
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ex parte, if he moves before the service of his answer, or on notice
to the plaintiff if he moves thereafter. The motion is for "leave as
third party plaintiff to serve a summons or complaint upon a person
not a party to the action." The form of the summons and complaint
is provided for m form 22, appended to the rules. The complaint is
served by the same method as other complaints, 4 1 and should have
44
a copy of the plaintiff's complaint attached.
The rule states, "The third party defendant may assert against
the plaintiff any defenses which the third party plaintiff has to the
plaintiffs claim." 4 5 This protects the impleaded party by giving him
an absolute right to assert any defenses available to the defendant.
4
Thus a binding adjudication will not violate due process. ,
Whenever a third party has been impleaded, whatever clami the
plaintiff has against the third party defendant may be asserted by
him with one limitation, that there must be an independent ground
of federal jurisdiction to support the claim. 47 If plaintiff does not
wish to assert his claim he need not do so."3 The defendant has a
parallel right which is subject to the same jurisdictional restriction. 4
The provision of Rule 14 as to counterclaim and cross claimsr0
are governed by Rule 1 3 .-- Essentially here is how the two rules
function together. If AB sues CD who impleads XY, then XY "must"
counterclaim against CD in any situation covered by Rule 13 (a)
since XY and CD are "opposing parties" within the meaning of Rule
13.52 XY "may" counterclaim CD in any situation governed by Rule
13 (b) XY may not counterclaim against AB under Rule 13 since
they are not "opposing parties." Under Rule 14(a) he may assert any
claim against AB which he has, and if he does so, then he and AB
become "opposing parties" and AB must counterclaim against XY
in the cases covered by Rule 13(a) and may counterclaim under
Rule 13(b) If AB asserts a claim against XY under Rule 14, then XY
must coumterclaim against AB pursuant to Rule 13(a) and may
counterclaim pursuant to Rule 13(b).
'FED. R. Civ. P 4 (1948).
"Snyder v. Le Roy Dyal Co., Inc. v. Robinsky, 1 F.R.D. :362 (S.D. N.Y.

1940).

See note 19 supra.
"See
the Advisory Committee note to Rule 14, 28 U.S. C.A. p. 541.
7
' Hoske v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lorrac Real Estate Corp., :39
F Supp. 805 (E.D. N.Y. 1941).
" Hemngton v. Jones, 2 F.R.D. 108 (E.D. La. 1941).

"Moms, Wheeler & Co., Inc. v. Rust Engineering Corp. v. Plain. Corp.,
4 F.R.D. 307 (D. Del. 1945).
'See note 19 supra.
" FED. R. Civ P., 18 (1948).
12

Ibid.
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One further and perhaps the most perplexing problem confronting
federal courts under Rule 14 was that relating to jurisdiction and
venue. Early commentators anticipated that the jurisdictional aspects
of the procedure would be troublesome. 5 3 The question is one of
great practical importance since strict requirements could altogether
defeat the purpose of the rule.A4 The real problem lay in a requirement such as diversity of citizenship. Suppose the defendant and
the impleaded party were both citizens of the same state? The courts
have generally settled the whole question by declaring that third
party proceedings are merely "ancillary" to the main action and thus
require no separate ground of jurisdiction.35
It appears that if third party mpleader is "ancillary" for jurisdictional purposes then it should also be so for purposes of venue
and at least one judge has expressed opinion to that effect.56 However,
there has been a sharp conflict m this question and m two Federal
decisions handed down only a few days apart contrary results were
reached.5 7 Although the third party may often be inconvenienced,
vet this fact appears to be outweighed by the advantages to be gained
in allowing impleader over an objection based upon lack of proper
venue, and such is the weight of authority 58
The primary purpose of this note has been to acquaint lawyers
with the general background of the procedure, its problems and their
solutions existing under Federal Rule 14 today To Kentucky, the
concept that a defendant may, with the courts permission, become a
plaintiff against a new party who is or may be liable to the defendant
for all or part of the plaintiff's claim is entirely new The theory of
our court has been very much like that of the early common law courts.
That is, a plaintiff is entitled to choose whom he may sue, and he
cannot be required to suffer strangers, against whom he is asserting

'

Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1322,

(1935).

'Crum v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 27 F Supp. 138, 139, (S.D.
W Va. 1939). judge McClintic said: "If the narrow construction claimed by the

Coal Company is put upon Rule 14, it wl be found that in the most numerous
class of cases in federal jurisdiction, the rule will be absolutely useless."
, Sheppard v. Atlantic States Gas Co. of Pa., 167 F 2d. 841 (3rd Cir. 1948);

Pvzvnsh- v. New York Cent. R. Co., 7 F.R.D. 302 (D.C. N.Y. 1946); Shannon v.

Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 62 F Supp. 532 (D.C. La. 1945); Hoslue v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 39 F Supp. 305 (D.C. N.Y. 1941).
"Morrell v. United Air Lines Transport Corp. 29 F Supp. 757, 758

(S.D. N.Y. 1939).

- Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corporation, 29 F Supp. 112 (D.
Conn. 1939); Ibid.

""Miller v. Hano, 8 F.R.D. 67 (D.C. E.D. Pa. 1947); Moncrief v. Pennsylvara

Ry. Co. v. joiner, 7:3 F Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Lesnik v. Public Industrials

Corp. 144 F 2d 968 (2nd Cir. 1944).
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no claim, to be brought in by the defendant. 59 Our civil code provides
that: "The court may determine any controversy between parties
before it, if it can do so without prejudice to others; if it cannot do
so, it must require such other persons to be made parties, or must
dismiss the action without prejudice.""0 This provision can be resorted
to by the parties or the court only where the party sought to be
brought in is indispensable to a complete determination of the suit."'
A further provision is made for the filing of a cross-petition by a defendant against a "
co-defendant, or a person who is not a
party to the action, or against both
" This will not be permitted,
however, "
except upon a cause of action which affects, or is
affected by the original cause of action
"02 The scope of the
above language, in so far as the word "affects, or is affected by" are
concerned, is not clear, and has given the Kentucky court some
trouble.63 The words "cause of action," however, definitely rule out
the possibility of a cross petition against a third person for indemnity
or contribution, since no cause of action for either can arise until
the present defendant has been adjudged liable and has paid the
judgment. 64 It is clear that our practice cannot be extended to the
broad limits comprehended by Rule 14.
Our courts are overcrowded, and the same principal reason which
brought about the adoption of impleader by the federal courtsexpediency in the settlement of suits-applies here. There is no
doubt that an impleader provision could be helpful. If such a right
were granted then a defendant could settle his clain for indemnity
or contribution in the same suit wherein his liability is tested. In
cases where a defendant's liability is only secondary a second suit
against the party primarily liable is almost certain. Thus where the
City of Louisville was forced to pay a judgment recovered against
it for injuries received by a traveler due to a defective metal pipe
laid in a sidewalk, it was permitted to recover in a later suit against
the abutting owner who was primarily bound to keep the sidewalk in
'Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Wright, 231 Ky. 713, 719, 22 S.W 2d 108,
110 (1929); Wahl v. Lockwood & Gasser 227 Ky. 183, 185, 12 S.W 2d, 321,
322 (1928); M. Livingston & Co. v. Philley, 155 Ky. 224, 226, 159 S.W 66.5

(1913).

'Ky. CODE. Crv. PRAc.

ANN. sec. 28 (Carrol's
" CLARK, CoDE PLEADING 409 (2d ed. 1947).

1948).

' Ky. CODE Civ. Prc. ANN. see. 96 (3) (Carrol's 1948).

An attempt was made to analyze tlus language in the case of Wahl v. Lockwood & Gasser, 227 Ky. 183, 187, 12 S.W 2d 321, 323 (1928). See also, City of
Georgetown v. Groff, 136 Ky 662, 124 S.W 888 (1910); Fritts v. Kirchdorfer,
136 Ky. 643, 124, S.W 882 (1910); Longhndge v. Cawood, 97 Ky. 533, 31 SAV

125 (1895).

"Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Wright, 231 Ky. 713, 730, 22 S.W 2d 108,

111 (1929).
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repair. ' , If the defendant city could have impleaded the abutting
owner, the second suit would have-been avoided.
Even more important is the fact that an inpleader provision permits litigants to participate in litigation vitally important to their
ultinate liability In Kentucky if X is injured through the negligence of A and B, a right of contribution between A and B is inchoate
from the date of the creation of relation between the parties giving
rise to common liability But, the right is not complete, so as to be
enforceable, until there has been "actual payment" of the common
obligation. Only then may A or B ask for and get contribution from
the other.'; Suppose X should join A and B m a suit for damages?
No issue can arise between the defendants, since neither has been
forced to pay any thing as yet. A verdict is directed m A s favor on
the question of negligence. B cannot object to this and yet if a
judgment is rendered against him and he later sues A for contribution
he may be met by a plea of res judicata.' 7 Had B been permitted in
the original action to become a plaintiff against A, he possibly could
have introduced more thorough proof of A s joint negligence and
thereby established B's right to contribution.
If third party impleader were adopted as a part of our civil procedure there is no doubt that some problems would arise, but these
could be met and disposed of in much the same way that federal
courts have disposed of problems arising under Rule 14. It is submitted that Kentucky should adopt the federal rule as it is today
CECIL
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City of Louisville v. Nicholls, 158 Ky. 516, 165 S.W 660 (1914); See
Brown Hotel Co. v. Pittsburgh Fuel Co. 811 Ky. 896, 224 S.W 2d 165 (1949);
City of Owensboro v. Skillman, 155 Kv. 108, 159 S.W 659 (1918) (Although
it ws found that the plaintiff in this second action was actually the party primarily liable and thus he had no nght to indemnity, if defendant here could have
been impleaded in the onginal suit, a second action would have been avoided.)

owner, the second suit would have been avoided.

- St. Lewis v. Mornson, 50 F Supp. 570 (D.C. Ky. 1948); Consolidated
Coach Corp. v. Burge, 245 Kv. 631, 54 S.W 2d 16 (1932).
"Hargis v. Noel, 310 Kv. 542, 221 S.W 2d (1949).

